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Abstract
This paper reports on Hungarian companies and how they perform on the global 
market. The first part of the paper provides some background and historic information 
on government support for export. Four successful companies were selected, from 
computer technology, acoustics, pharmaceutical industry and lighting retailing. These 
four companies are very different, however they all became successful 
internationally. We set out to provide an insight into their success by describing their 
case from their origins to the present day.
Introduction
Since the political and economic changes of 1989, Hungary has steadily 
developed into one of Central Europe’s most attractive business environments, states 
the country commercial guide recently prepared by the American Embassy in 
Budapest. The level of political, structural and economic stability it has achieved 
demonstrates the success of its transition to a modern market economy (Hungarian 
Economy, October, 2000).
2Hungary no longer requires International Monetary Funding (IMF) financial 
assistance and has repaid all its debts to the Fund. Hungary’s currency, the Forint 
(HUF), became fully convertible for current account purposes in 1996. The 
Hungarian Economy (October 2000) citing the latest economic figures states that 
GDP growth in 1999 was 4.5 percent and was predicted to reach 5-5.6 percent by the 
end of 2000. The volume of exports grew by 29.7 percent in 1999, while imports 
increased by 29.7 percent. The value of exports went up by 8.7 percent (USD 25 
billion), while the increase of imports was 9 percent (USD 28 billion). Inflation rate 
fell rapidly from an annual average of 18.4 percent in 1997 to 14.3 percent in 1998 
and then to 10.3 percent in 1999.
With about USD 23 billion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since 1989, 
Hungary has been a leading destination for FDI in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Almost 75 percent of Hungarian exports are produced fully or partially by foreign 
owned companies. Fifty-five percent of FDI is invested in the industrial sector, 
particularly automotive and information technology.
The private sector produces over 80 percent of GDP. Foreign owners control 
90 percent of telecommunications, 70 percent of financial institutions, 66 percent of 
industry, 60 percent of energy production, and 50 percent of the trading sector 
(Hungarian Economy, October 2000). Some 1700 of 2000 state-owned companies 
were privatised between 1989 and 1999, with another 44 still to go (Hungarian 
Economy, October 2000).
 Hungary was and is a popular choice for investors with its reasonably stable 
political and economic system with its relatively good infrastructure and highly 
trained cheap labour (Illes, 1997).
The investment and transfer of know how from the West to the East have been 
well researched and published.  However very little has been said about companies 
from the former Eastern-block countries who have become successful outside of their 
home markets. The authors of this paper set out to investigate whether Hungarian 
companies can succeed in the West and if so, how they achieve this.
Initially we checked the rules and regulations for overseas activities, collected 
some historic data and also investigated the available support that Hungarian 
companies could get if they wanted to enter foreign markets with their products or 
services.
3During our research we interviewed ministry officials, members of support 
organisations and leaders of internationally successful Hungarian companies.
Background
We learnt from an interview that took place in the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs that there had always been some sort of foreign trade involving a selected 
group of Hungarian companies. However, in the command economy companies were 
not allowed to trade freely abroad. Typically companies traded through a foreign 
trade company. These companies were set up and tightly controlled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The company whose products were sold abroad did not have any 
influence on price or any other terms and conditions of the sale. It was all very slow 
and bureaucratic, so little wonder that most companies were not inspired to pursue 
this route and they chose to sell their products within Hungary.  From the late 1960s 
however, central control eased somewhat and companies such as Tungsram and 
Ikarus managed to get permission for setting up an independent trade agency in the 
West. Tungsram exported lightbulbs and Ikarus exported buses. Whilst these agencies 
were usually small affairs with only 1-2 employees, they could however act directly 
on behalf of the company.
Up till 1975 all foreign trade activities had to be given permission by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade. After 1975 the process of export started to become easier, 
however companies still had to fill in many forms and comply with all kinds of 
regulations. Foreign trade only started to be relatively easy since 1996 when the 
Hungarian currency became convertible. 
Why is it then that there are still not many Hungarian companies trading 
abroad? Why is it that only 25% of the export is produced by Hungarian companies 
and the rest is by foreign owned companies who operate in Hungary?
As we learnt from our interviews, some of the products are not competitive 
enough. Hungarian food and wine for example find it difficult to penetrate the 
saturated and protective Western markets. There are no real government incentives 
for companies to encourage export. The Ministry set up an organisation called ITD 
Hungary (International Trade Development) to promote Hungary abroad and to 
attract investors to the country in 1993. It has only been representing and promoting 
individual companies abroad since 1999. There are ITD Hungary offices in 36 
countries and they are often linked to the trade section of Hungarian embassies. They 
produce brochures, organise and attend fairs and trade events. They are a 
4government-funded non-profit organisation who provide information free of charge. 
ITD Hungary also has regional offices in the country so in theory companies could 
use them as a source of information about business opportunities overseas. From the 
interview we found out, however, that it is only their officers close to the borders that 
are approached by companies who want to do business in the neighbouring countries.  
The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Hungarian Investment Bank together 
with other banks set up a state-owned organisation called Corvinus Plc in 1997 with 
the aim to provide capital investments in companies that propose investments outside 
Hungary.  The starting capital of the company was 3.5 million US dollars. After an 
unsuccessful investment into China, they narrowed their activities to Central and 
Eastern European countries.  At the time of the interview Corvinus was involved in 
six projects. Their biggest investment was in Romania to manufacture electric 
engines.  When a company finds a good business opportunity in the neighbouring 
countries they can put a business plan together and approach Corvinus. The plan is 
discussed, the risk is analysed and when Corvinus is satisfied then they decide the 
size of the investment and also the proportion of ownership that Corvinus as an 
investor will have.
Apart from these two government initiatives  Hungarian enterpreneurs can 
rely only on their own networks, contacts and innovative ideas to succeed at home or 
abroad.
Some of the Hungarian companies we discuss became successful worldwide 
with their own technological inventions, in spite of the almost  hostile climate for 
innovation. Between 1940 and 1990 the proportion of original industrial products and 
technologies in Hungary fell from 30% to 3%, and the average age of the industrial 
products was almost 16 years at the end of the 1980s. 'Hungary has arrived at the 
drasctic political changes of 1989 without a clearly formulated and properly 
functioning innovation and technology policy. It is true that the importance of 
innovation and technical development has been stressed during the last decade in 
innumerable governmental declarations and decisions. But in reality innovation and 
technology policy has never been -with a few exceptions- and still is not, considered 
the pivot of the government’s economic policy' (Szántó, 1994).
The present government (elected in 1998) even downgraded the National 
Committe for Technological Development (OMFB), which had been working for 
decades as a quasi-ministry, and instead of developing it into a real western-type 
5Ministry of Technology and Innovation it was turned into a department within the 
Ministry of Education since January 1st, 2000.
Then how is it possible that innovation can thrive in some firms in this hostile 
environment? The secret is perhaps in the Hungarian character (Illes and Rees, 2000). 
Hungarians over the centuries have developed a strong sense of survival and 
adaptability. There is a Hungarian saying which goes: ’one has to learn to live on ice.’ 
And this is exactly what they do. Hungarians truly mean that ’knowledge is power’  
and learning has always been an important weapon in their fight for survival. The 
country has a traditionally high quality education system. Government reports 
regularly mention that Hungary has the most Nobel Laureates per capita in the world 
(Hungarian Economy, October 2000). The country gave 12 Nobel-prize winners to 
the world. Hungarian scientists and engineers have invented a lot of substantial 
products and technologies such as the torsion pendulum by Lóránd Eötvös for 
measuring very small differences in gravity, used e.g. during the exploration of 
Californian oil fields, the carburator by János Csonka, the electric transformer by Ottó 
Titusz Bláthy, Miksa Déri, and Károly Zipernowsky, the DC-generator (utilizing the 
dynamo-principle) by Ányos Jedlik, the telephone-centre by Tivadar Puskás, the 
electric locomotive by Kálmán Kandó, the ball-point pen and the automatic gearbox 
by József Bíró, nuclear fission and reactor (and unfortunately the nuclear bomb as 
well) by Leó Szilárd, Ede Teller, and Jenö Wigner (in cooperation with the Italian 
Enrico Fermi), the computer by János Neumann, holography by Dénes Gábor, or the 
popular toy, Rubic-cube by Ernö Rubik Jr., etc. (Bödök, 1999; Németh, 1999; Rosta, 
1999).
 This tradition of high standard scientific and technological education and 
creative innovation has survived and still survives the decades of innovation-careless 
governance. There are still a lot of talented, highly educated and motivated innovators 
in Hungary, in spite of the lack of innovation and technology policy (and ministry) 
for decades and all the problems of the economic, social and political transition 
during the 1990s. 
In our research we set out to find some of the successful Hungarian innovators 
who have managed to overcome not only the challenges of a transitional economy but 
also managed to find their market niche in the world economy.
When we designed our research we wanted to illustrate as widely as possible 
how Hungarian companies succeed in the global economy. Unfortunately we could 
6not find any statistics about the overall performance of Hungarian companies abroad. 
So all we could aim for at this stage was to select companies that could represent a 
cross section of internationally successful Hungarian enterprises. The four companies 
that we studied represent four different industries. They also differ in market share 
and value. However, they are all success stories that illustrate how disadvantage can 
be turned into an opportunity and how hard work and creativity can lead to success 
almost regardless of circumstances. 
Once we identified the companies that we intended to study we aimed to 
collect all available published materials about them. We also used our personal 
contacts to set up meetings and interviews with various representatives of these 
organisations. All companies were very helpful in providing the data for our research. 
In order to try and compare  the four companies we tried to follow the same structure 
in the case studies.
Graphisoft Plc.
The beginning
Graphisoft is a software company founded by Gábor Bojár in 1982, taking 
advantage of the opportunity created by the Hungarian reform-communist 
government pioneering the liberalization of private entrepreneurship in the Eastern 
Block. The new firm was based on the traditionally high quality mathematics 
education and culture of the country. Due to the very high number of mathematics 
and computer science graduates there was a surplus of excellent professionals in this 
field in Hungary, so a high number of them tried to find a job abroad, or at least to 
work for foreign software companies without moving abroad. The founders of 
Graphisoft chose a different strategy. He and his team decided to develop a novel 
product and sell it worldwide.
The economic liberalization mentioned above was only relative to the 
previous era, and didn’t compare to West-European circumstances. There was a 
serious lack of private capital and bank loan for entrepreneurs. Economics policy of 
the government was inconsistent, sometimes contradictory, and unforeseeably 
everchanging because of the endless tug of war between the reform-communists and 
the hardliners. Technological and business infrastructure were both very poor, there 
7were serious COCOM restrictions of high-tech import, etc. But Gábor Bojár, the 
founder of Graphisoft emphasises the surprising fact that these unfavourable 
conditions finally helped  Graphisoft in its development in two ways:
• COCOM restrictions created a market demand for their expertise which demand 
otherwise would have been satisfied by Western software products; and
• because of the restrictions they had to work on extremely low performance, small 
home computers, while Western software engineers worked on high performance 
working stations not available in Hungary, so when personal computers took over 
the key role in computing Hungarian software professionals already knew how to 
develop ’a great software for small computers' (Graphisoft, 2001).
The development of the firm up to the present
They decided to develop their software products on Appple Macintosh 
computers, and it was an important part of their ’garage image’. Grafisoft was sept up 
in 1982 by Gábor Bojár and Gábor Tari-István. The two innovators spent the first two 
years primarily on product development. During these two years they had a revenue 
of a few HUF millions, working on various government funded projects in a small 
attic. From 1985 they started to sell ArchiCAD first in Italy and in France and 
gradually in all European countries.  Since 1987 Graphisoft is the largest Hungarian 
software exporter. In 1992, a decade since its foundation, the firm earned 6.2 million 
dollars sales with 87 employees. Considering this fast and large-scale development 
Graphisoft seems to be a typical ’gazelle’ firm i.e. a rapidly growing company with 
little experience in business but with high level of readiness for entrepreneurship and 
change in this early period (Vecsenyi & Kovach, 1996; Vecsenyi, 2001). Today 
Graphisoft has 12 subsidiaries with more than 300 employees all over the world, a 
brand new, large, modern, beautiful headquarters in Budapest which was nominated 
for an architectural award, and the firms annual sales reached 4.7. million Euro 
(Graphisoft Annual Report, 1999).
Their most succesful product is ArchiCAD, a several times award-winning 
architectural CAD (Computer Aided Design) software, world market leader on Apple 
Macintosh platform, sold in 80 countries on 25 local languages, and used by more 
than 100,000 architects worldwide. Another succesful and profitable product of them 
was a nuclear power station planning and controlling software. In 1990 Graphisoft 
became the exclusive dealer of Apple hardware in Hungary. Though both the 
hardware dealer and the nuclear power station software business were profitable, they 
8decided to sell those and focus on the core business of architectural CAD software 
development.  The strategy worked and ArchiCAD became a worldwide success. In 
1993 Graphisoft launched the Windows version of  ArchiCAD. This was the only 
architectural CAD software available both for Macintosh and Windows platform.
Graphisoft’s key technology is the Virtual Building concept, using three 
dimensional object oriented modelling, building simulation and group design. We use 
the term ’key technology’ in the sense Little (1981) use this term: it’s unique, just a 
few companies (sometimes only one) possess it, and it’s a source of competitive 
advantage. This type of technology is sometimes also called ’differentiation 
technology’ (Morin, 1985) or ’sufficient technology’ in the mathematical sense of the 
word (Price, 1996). We don’t accept the term ’sufficient’ because a great 
technological advancement can’t guarantee business success in itself. As Katz and 
Allen point out ( 1988); ’Witness, for example, the problems of Xerox, where the 
R&D labs have generated and surfaced many major new advances and approaches 
only to discover that the company has failed to fully exploit and capture benefit from 
many of them.’ A well known example of Xerox’s failures to commercialize their 
inventions is the graphic user interface with windows, roll-down menues, and the 
mouse for computers. They developed this revolutionary technology in the late 
seventies, used it in-house, but weren’t able to exploit it in the market. Steve Jobs, co-
founder of Apple Computers saw it during a company visit at Xerox, and utilized it in 
the development of Liza and Macintosh models. Graphisoft, on the contrary, was able 
to take advantage of its technological advancements.
Virtual Building technology is not only a tool for better productivity of the 
design process but a tool of visual communication as well by which architects can 
show their plans with the help of photorealistic 3D pictures and virtual reality 
animations to their clients. Graphisoft’s mission is playing a leading role in this task 
in the hope of a better and nicer built environment. Graphisoft are pioneers not only 
in technological innovation but also in the successful commercialization of their 
innovative product on the world market.
 These technological advances of Graphisoft have become base technologies in 
CAD industry for today. We use the term ’base technology’ in the sense Little (1981) 
use this word: it is common, required to enter the industry concerned, readily 
available, and every (or at least most) firm in this business use it. This type of 
9technology is sometimes also called ’necessary technology’ in the mathematical sense 
of the word (Price, 1996), and this time we accept this second term as well.
Gábor Bojár believes that the key of Graphisoft’s success is their well-
educated, highly qualified, and outstandingly motivated workforce. He consideres 
motivation the most important factor. His philosophy is that exceptional economic 
success emerges from the desire to prove yourself as a nation. This is what the 
Germans and Japanese did  after World War II. People who work for Graphisoft are 
people who want to prove that they are the best in their field even in the international 
market.
At the beginning many of their western software dealer partners advised them 
to hide the Hungarian origin of their software behind a West-European firm’s name 
because of the western customers’ bias and mistrust of high-tech products made in the 
’Eastern Block’. It is still quite common to sell Hungarian software products under 
the flag of a western software firm so the customers have no idea of the Hungarian 
origin of the product. But Gábor Bojár disagreed with them because their products 
were not consumer products, they are bought by professionals, and Hungarian 
software engineers have always had high reputations. Graphisoft has never hidden the 
real origin of its products and nowadays nobody gives them such advice. The firm 
became world famous as a Hungarian firm, without any tricks to hide its real 
nationality.
The world’s most influental political, scientific and business leaders meet in 
Davos, Switzerland every year to discuss the development of world economy. In 2000 
the Davos forum launched a new programme called ’Technology Pioneers’. They 
invite MDs of  top high-tech firms and ask them to tell their company’s success 
stories and share their views about the future. These speakers are more the men and 
women of the future than of the present. In 2001 Gábor Bojár was invited to take part 
in the Technology Pioneers program at Davos. He said that information technology 
was  the only chance for Hungary to catch up with the most developed part of the 
world (Fülöp, 2001).
Plans for the future
In January, 2001 Graphisoft founded GDL Technology, a subsidiary providing 
GDL (Geometric Description Language) software products for architectural designing 
offices, building companies and facility management firms to get access to the 
electronic catalogues of building material and accessory manufacturers and traders. 
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The new firm is continuously broadening the selection of their DGL tools, to make 
them available for a wider and wider customer base. Stefan Larsson, the marketing 
director of GDL Technolgy states that this new object-oriented technology is the most 
significant progress in this business since the invention of CAD, and offers great 
advantage for the clients as the Internet-based product catalogues are becoming 
generally used. The head of the new firm is András Haidekker, former head of the 
UK subsidiary of Graphisoft producing 80% increase in sales in 2000. Before that he 
used to be a software developing engineer and sales manager in Graphisoft’s 
headquarters. The centre of the new subsidiary is in Budapest and they plan to open 
their offices first in the UK, Germany, and the USA (Graphisoft, 2001).
In February, 2001 Graphisoft USA merged with Drawbase, another successful 
American subsidiary of Graphisoft, the market leader of providing CAFM (Computer 
Aided Facility Management) software solutions. Drawbase CAFM products are used 
by more than 18,000 users, including such prestigious customers such as the US 
Department of Defence or the World Bank, covering various kinds of business 
organizations from Fortune 500 big companies to small enterprises. The main market 
segments are: healthcare, finance (banks, brokerage, insurance), commercial real 
estate, higher education, retail, interior design, federal government, and other ’large 
space’ market sectors (Drawbase, 2001).
The newly merged firm is based in Boston, San Francisco and San Antonio. 
The head of the new company is Al Moulton, previously the president of Drawbase 
for 15 years, who led his company into a market leader position in the CAFM 
business. Tamás Hajas, former president of Graphisoft USA for the last 3 years came 
back to the Budapest headquarters of Graphisoft and was appointed to the vice-
president of Graphisoft group responsible for strategy formulation. Before becoming 
the president of Graphisoft USA he used to be the vice-president for R&D of the 
group.With this merger all the American subsidiaries of Graphisoft became one large 
company, hoping to create significant synergies between providing computer support 




Pharmavit is a pharmaceutical company founded by Dr. Imre Somody in 
1988. The firm has a formal mission and vision statement, as follows.
’Pharmavit Plc. considers its mission to provide their customers products 
which contribute to the preservation or restoration of their health in an economical 
way, and which are necessary and useful for the society. Pharmavit Plc.’s activity 
contributes to giving health a higher priority among people’s values, to the 
development of health-consciousness, and to the dissemination of healthy life style 
models. As a result of all this our vision is a more healthy Central and East-European 
society, both physically and mentally.’
Imre Somody graduated as an economist in the former East-Germany, and 
started to work at Chinoin Plc., one of the most prestigious Hungarian pharmaceutical 
company in 1981. He found that the Soviet-type concepts he had studied were mostly 
useless in the real world of Hungarian economy, so he took up  the management 
programme of the Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest to study useful 
modern business concepts. After graduating he continued his studies at postgraduate 
level and obtained  a doctoral degree in business economics. He spent five months at 
Frankfurt University as a visiting scholar in 1985.
Dr. Somody and some other young members of Chinoin’s management team 
proposed to produce vitamin effervescent tablets, which where almost unknown in 
Hungary in that time. The board of the company rejected their idea, but Imre Somody 
and his team finally found a compromise with the CEO, István Bihari. Chinoin didn’t 
want to set up an effervescent production line, but was ready to help Dr. Somody’s 
team to found a spin-off company for manufacturing such products. Chinoin invested 
a building site with infrastructure into the project in a village called Veresegyház. 
However, the Somody team had to raise the rest of the capital that the business 
required. So the popular belief that Dr. Imre Somody broke up with Chinoin when he 
started his enterprise, is not true (Binder, 1996).
The Somody team chose a rather unusual way to find investors. They looked 
through the telephone directories, identified and contacted those who, in their view 
had the interest and the money to invest into their business idea. In spite of the 
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unusual method of research, they succeeded, and Pharmavit Ltd. was founded by 5 
Hungarian and foreign firms as investors, including Chinoin, with  HUF 66,5 million 
capital in 1988. The new production facility was built up in 5 months, and started to 
produce two kinds of vitamin effervescent tablets, named 'Plusssz'. The company had 
18 employees, in 1989. 
These origins have developed into a present-day legend for today: the six founding 
members of the company's management team used to work in an attic. They had to 
keep the window open even during the winter because they wanted to hear the ring of 
the public telephone in the street. Why? Because they used the public phone as their 
official telephone line of the company. (In the 1980s there was still a serious shortage 
of business and private telephone lines in Hungary. One of the co-authors of this 
paper for example had to wait 12 and a half years for his private telephone line. And 
he felt lucky when he finally got his telephone line because other people had to wait  
even longer.) The number of the telephone box was Pharmavit’s number, and they 
answered the phone in that street box as it would have been a normal company line 
(Plusssz, 2001).
The development of the firm up to the present
Plusssz vitamin effervescent tablets were a great success from the very 
beginning, and it became a fashion to drink vitamin drinks made from these tablets. A 
very important contributing factor in Plusssz products’ market success was the fact 
that Pharmavit contracted with Krisztina Egerszegi, multiple olympic, world, and 
European champion, world record holder swimmer, to be the front person of the 
Plusssz advertisement campaign.  It was a very good choice because Egerszegi was 
one of the most popular, if not the most popular sportswoman in Hungary at that time, 
not only because of her sport success but also because of her pleasant personality. 
There was a perfect match between the healthy life style image of the product and the 
young, healthy and cheerful image of the succesful and popular sportswoman. This 
cooperation was so successful that she is an employee of Pharmavit even today, 
working in the promotion of their products.
In 1990 Pharmavit and an Austrian pharmaceutical company, Genericon 
Pharma founded Pharmagen Ltd. to produce generic pharmaceuticals (the first of their 
product was  Diclofenac, a cream for painful muscles). In 1991 Pharmagen was 
merged with Pharmavit.
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In 1992 Pharmavit began to export its products, at first in the neighbouring 
countries. In 1994 Pharmavit founded subsidiaries in Prague, Bratislava, Warsaw and 
Bukarest. In the same year Pharmavit transformed from an Ltd. into a Plc., and its 
shares were sold mainly to foreign investors, primarily to institutions. Imre Somody 
took out a bank loan to buy Pharmavit shares and became one of the key shareholders 
of the firm. After that Pharmavit went to the international stock market from London 
to New York. Its shares were sold for 5960% of their nominal value. After the 
international introduction they also introduced their shares at an equally high price to 
the Budapest stock market. This way Pharmavit’s capital increased to HUF 176,5 
million. The rise of capital allowed the company to invest into a new production 
facility in a new building. This started to operate in 1995. Dr. Somody was able to 
pay back his bank loans from his profit coming from the great increase of his shares 
price, and suddenly became one of the richest Hungarian multimillionaires.
The culmination point of Pharmavit’s success story was when more and more 
multinational companies made offers to acquire Pharmavit. Imre Somody felt that 
they had reached the limits of their possibilities as a relatively small company and the 
further development of the firm needed a partner with much more capital. After long 
negotiations and careful consideration he and the other owners of the company 
decided to accept the offer of Bristol-Myers Squibb, a leading diversified worldwide 
health and personal care company. In 1996 Bristol-Myers Squibb became a 99% 
owner of Pharmavit for 110 million US dollars. Bristol-Myers Squibb’s principal 
businesses are medicines, beauty care, nutritionals and medical devices, and 
Pharmavit widened its operation to these fields as well, by enlargening their 
production facilities again in 1997.
After becoming a Bristol-Myers Squibb company Imre Somody remained the 
CEO of the firm, the new owners asked him to continue his work at the top of the 
organization. In 2000 Dr. Somody announced the revamping of their traditional 
success products, the Plusssz vitamin effervescent tablets. It became necessary 
because a domestic (Béres) and a foreign (Pez-Haas) competitor entered the market, 
reducing Plusssz tablets’ turnover by 70%. Market research revealed that 76% of the 
consumers wanted the renewal of Plusssz tablets. (Élelmiszer Online, 2001) The new 
Plusssz tablets have  a new composition. They taste better and dissolve 50% faster in 
water They appear in a more fashionable package and the old disc shape of the 
tablettes was changes into a trefoil shape.
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Pharmavit products are sold in more and more countries including countries of 
Asia. The company has more than 450 employees now, in contrast with the 18 at the 
beginning 12 years ago.
Imre Somody’s personal career is also impressive. He won the Manager of the 
Year prize and the Aschner Lipót prize in 1996, the Hungarian Business prize and the 
Man of the Year prize in 1998, and the George Washington prize in New York in 
1999 (previously given e.g. to János Neumann, Ede Teller, Yehudi Menuhin, and the 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Elie Wiesel). He is a member of the government’s 
economic policy and science policy advisory board since 1999.
Plans for the future
Pharmavit has a statement of its goal and vision as follows. ’Our aim is to 
become the leading health provider company of Hungary in the new millenium, 
giving one of the most significant contribution to people’s beauty, health and 
recovery.’ Pharmavit’s future is an integral part of  Bristol-Myers Squibb’s future, 
and can’t be considered on its own. Focusing on Pharmavit’s classic product line, 
Plusssz vitamin effervescent tablets only, the company achieved the sales of HUF 
1500 million in 2000 and forecasts HUF 2200-2500 million sales in 2001 (Élelmiszer 
Online, 2001).
We think that Imre Somody’s personal endeavours and plans are at least as 
interesting as Pharmavit’s. Over the years he became the role model of a successful 
entrepreneur who unlike many, cares not only for his interests but also for the 
interests of others. Dr. Somody, became famous not only because of his financial 
success but because of his high moral standards and social responsibility. Imre 
Somody  is known for using his personal wealth rather than the company's for charity 
and other public purposes. Somody and two other businessmen set up a private fund 
called the 'Bolyai János Prize' to reward the best Hungarian scientists in 1998. The 
founders wanted this prize to be codified by the Hungarian parliament, and the legal 
difficulties took 2 years to resolve. In 2000 Árpád Göncz, the president of the 
Hungarian Republic handed over the first Bolyai János prize to Tamás Freund, the 
internationally recognized brain researcher, member of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences.
In 2000 Imre Somody and the local authority of Veresegyháza founded 
Mission Health Centre, an experimental model of the modern and human health care 
institute based on social insurance. The aim of the experiment is to reveal the sources 
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of unefficiency in social insurance based health service and to use money more cost-
effectively than the conventional system. Dr. Somody spent his own money for this 




Etalon Acoustics is a high-end audiofile stereo equipment manufacturer 
founded by László Sallai and his wife in 1993. They develop and produce stereo 
amplifiers and loudspeakers. It’s a small enterprise with about 7 employees. Sallai is 
not only the head of the firm but the developer of their products as well. He considers 
himself much more an engineer than a businessman. It is interesting that despite being 
a stereo component designer he is not an electronic engineer by training: he graduated 
as a mechanical engineer in Germany. He used to work as a consultant and 
representative for the world famous Danish companies Brüel & Kjaer (over 14 years) 
and for Ortofon (over 12 years), and became an expert of acoustics not only in the 
field of music reproduction but in a wide variety of applications, such as safety 
measurements of vibrations in nuclear power stations or medical diagnostics. After 
more than 25 years of research he established two small enterprises, Sonophil  Ltd. – 
dealing with music recordings and CD productions –, and Etalon Acoustics Ltd. – 
manufacturing high-end audio products. This combination of his two firms is the only 
one in the world having own-developed products from the microphones in the 
recording room up to the loudspeakers used in the listening room.
Sonophil recorded  more than 60 CDs in the past years for worldwide famous 
companies, such as Hungaroton, CBS, Naxos and Harmonia Mundi, France. Famous 
conductors and composers such asClaudio Abbado, Leonard Bernstein, John Cage, 
Sergiu Celibidache, Péter Eötvös, Iván Fisher, Kobayashi Ken Ichiro, György Kurtág, 
György Ligeti and Sándor Szokolay were impressed by their work. Leonard Bernstein 
recommended the small Hungarian company to Deutsche Grammophon. After several 
recordings with Maestro Sergiu Celibidache and the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra, 
the Maestro – impressed by the ’authentic sound’ of Sonophil recordings, 
recommended the company to Philips Classics. Sonophil also received the highest 
acknowledgement from the top management of Denon.
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In the seventies László Sallay and one of his colleauges founded the 
predecessor of Etalon Acoustics, the firm we focus on now. The name of the firm was 
different, but the brandname of their products was Etalon. They made sound 
recordings and developed and manufactured sound reproduction equipment. At the 
beginning of the 1990s the two owners decided to split and folow their own ways 
separately because of personal frictions, so László Sallay and his wife founded Etalon 
Acoustics in 1993. The firm is still theirs, without any other owners, and has never 
received any bank loans.
László Sallay cherished a dream from his childhood: it was always a 
disappointment for him to hear the difference between live concert music and the 
sound of his father’s radio, so his desire was to reproduce high quality  live music. 
His main motivation was an inner cultural need for making the listening to realistic 
reproduced music at home possible. Although they haven’t got a western-fashioned 
formal mission statement, obviously the satisfaction of this need can be considered 
the mission of Etalon Acoustics Ltd.
The development of the firm up to the present
László Sallay’s view of the stereo equipment industry is not typical of the 
mainstream of the hifi business, but similar to some other ’esoteric’ high-end 
component manufacturers. In his opinion the reproduction of live music at the very 
beginning was not a business but a trial to transfer music for a much broader audience 
than ever before. The original aim was to share the joy of music with a very large 
number of people, most of whom never would go to a concert or to the opera. But 
later it became clear that sound reproduction is a very good business, and hifi industry 
split into two parts: one ismore technical, trying to approache the realistic 
reproduction of live music within the limits of technology, and the other is 
commercial, focusing on sales figures. The Hifi industry is largely determined by the 
commercial way, but Etalon Acoustics is among those few who chose thetechnical 
aspect. They don’t want to tell the customers what they should need and buy like the 
commercialists, who always generate newer and newer hifi fashion-wawes to 
stimulate market demand. Etalon people try to find better and better technological 
solutions to approach closer and closer lifelike sound reproduction, which they think 
fulfills people’s need, and offer them these solutions, i.e. audiophile equipment.
Etalon products have been sold in West-Europe since 1988, and their sales 
figures increased near to the present level in 1990-1992. At the time they entered the 
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market the main stream of hifi industry was ’over-engineering’, i.e. all equipment 
were full of expensive military standard parts and components, and the design of their 
electronic circuits were all extremely overcomplicated. If somebody opened the house 
of an Etalon product, it seemed almost ’empty’ in comparison with the over-
engineered mainstream ones. Everybody was surprised, and the typical reaction of 
German, French, and Dutch hifi merchants and journalists was that Etalon 
equipments are ’empty, expensive, but good-sounding’.
Being expensive meant that they seemed to be expensive partly relative to the 
amount of components they were built from, and partly because of their Hungarian 
origin. But they were not and are not expensive compared to their western 
competitors’ products: in fact they are 30…50% cheaper than their rivals. László 
Sallay was often toldthat Etalon products should be cheaper partly becuse they 
contain far fewer parts and components, and partly because they are produced in 
Hungary when saleries and wages are much lower than in West-Europe. Sallay’s 
reply to the first point was that his products are cheaper than their western rivals and 
still have a better sound quality, as hifi experts admitted, so the price must be 
proportional with the result, not with the number of components. His answer to the 
second remark was that Audi TT and some other fashionable West-European cars are 
also manufactured in Hungary but nobody thinks they should be cheaper because of 
the lower Hungarian salaries and wages. He thinks that Etalon products are already 
cheaper enough compared to their western rivals on the international market.
Etalon Acoustics had to overcome some of the common barriers to entry faced 
by a new business, described by Porter (1979, 1980) in his famous ’five forces’ 
model:
• Capital requirements – costs of entering the industry act as a deterrent,
• Brand preferences and customer loyalty – it’s difficult for a new entrant to prise 
customer away from their existing suppliers,
• Access of distribution channels – the new entrant can’t reach the customer as 
effectively as the incumbent firms, so it will not be its products or services that are 
sold.
Capital requirements were so high that Etalon Acoustics wasn’t able to start 
up its own high-tech loudspeaker unit manufacturing company at the beginning. 
Loudspeaker units’ manufacturing technology is very sophisticated and needs a huge 
investment, and some parts of it are key technologies. Etalon had to make a 
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compromise and to buy the units from prestigous manufacturers abroad and build 
their loudspeaker systems from these units. László Sallay explains their loudspeaker 
systems’ more modest succes with this compromise. The big loudspeaker unit 
manufacturers refused to produce special types in those very small quantities which 
Etalon Acoustics ordered for reasons of economies of scale. They were willing only 
to do some slight modifications in their normal types on the series produced to fulfill 
Etalon’s orders. Mr. Sallay had to further modify these units before building into his 
systems but even in this way he wasn’t able to build exactly the systems they wanted. 
Capital requirements were not so high in amplifier manufacturing because the 
necessary components are available and manufacturing technology is relatively 
simple and cheap, it’s mainly a base technology. Consequently there was no need to 
make a compromise in the design of Etalon amplifiers, and they became very 
succesful.
Brand preferences and customer loyalty was also a barrier at the beginning. 
Like Gábor Bojár of Graphisoft, László Sallay was also advised to hide the Hungarian 
origin of Etalon equipment. In response Sallay put a distinctly visible sign onto the 
front panel of every Etalon equipment saying that “carefully handmade in Hungary”. 
Today it is quite different: Etalon has made a name for itself and has its own loyal 
customers.
Access of distribution channels was perhaps the most serious problem at the 
start. László Sallay phoned the well-known high-end audiphile equipment merchants 
all over Europe, but about 85% of them refused even to try his products. They just 
ridiculed him on the phone and rang off when he told them that he offered high-end 
audio products from Hungary. Approximately 15% of them also laughed at him but 
didn’t rang off at once so Sallay was able to convince them that he might have 
something serious for them, especially as he was ready to drive thousands of 
kilometers at his own cost to demonstrate the abilities of his products. He said  they 
would regret not test-listening them. He called them up again and again until some 
merchants were willing to receive him and try out his products free of charge, maybe 
in the hope of a good laugh. The listening tests convinced them all, and they began to 
sell Etalon products.
More and more customers test-listened to and bought Etalon products, so hifi 
journalists became curious of these newcomer but promising equipments. The 
measurement and listening test results were excellent, and the high recommendations 
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of the hifi journals (Home Studio in Holland; Revue du Son, Haute Fidelite, and 
Diapason in France; Stereo, High Fidelity, Hör Erlebnis Forum, and HiFi Vision in 
Germany, Alta Fidelidad in Spain, HiFi World in UK, Fedelta del Suono, Stereo, 
Suono, and Audio Review in Italy, and Ihos in Greece) generated even more demand. 
Etalon amplifiers have been compared to Audio Research, Jadis, Lectron, Cello, 
Conrad Johnson, Primare, Accuphase, Burmester, Gryphon, YBA, Goldmund, Naim, 
Linn, Mark Levinson, Krell, Threshold, Jeff Rowland, Spectral, Classé Audio, FM 
Acoustics, etc. with excellent results: they were found to be at least on the same or 
even on higher level than the most famous products, for a lower price. The prestigous 
French audiofile magazin, Diapason chose Etalon equipment for ’The Best HiFi 
Product of the Year’ five times during the nineties, and uses them as references, i.e. 
compares every tested stereo equipment to their Etalon counterparts as benchmarks, 
so the brandname ’Etalon’ became reality. László Sallay was awarded the HiFi Oscar 
Prize for his Etalon products in Italy in 1998. Apart from the UK and the 
Scandinavian countries Etalon products are sold almost all over Europe, some 
hundreds per year. Etalon Acoustics’s annual sales increased to 1 million dollars, but 
three years ago it decreased with almost 50% because of the recession of the high-end 
audio market. A lot of audiofile manufacturers and merchants went bankrupt since 
then, but Etalon Acoustics managed to survive and is still profitable.
Just like Graphisoft, Etalon Acoustics also has a key technology. It is László 
Sallay’s sophisticated mathematical modelling method which enables him to find 
connection between the characteristics of electronic signals and subjective sound 
quality. It’s not an electronic circuit design, it’s a mathematical procedure, suitable 
for optimizing the design of any kind of audio equipment. Sallay regards his 
mathematical modelling invention as the secret of Etalon products’ outstanding sound 
quality. Unlike Graphisoft’s case this key technology haven’t become the industry’s 
base technology during the years because it is still Etalon Acoustics’ secret. This 
mathematical modelling procedure is a typical core competence in the sense Hamel 
and Prahalad (1990, 1994) use this term:
• it provides competitive advantage,
• it’s translated into customer-perceived value,
• it’s difficult to imitate (impossible in this case),
• it’s extendable to new products or markets.
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The only thing competitors were able to imitate was the minimalist concept 
inner design. A decade ago Etalon’s ’empty boxes’ surprised audio experts who had 
become used to the typical over-engineered products of that time. But nowadays this 
simplistic approach is more and more common, and there are more and more rivals of 
Etalon looking very similar inside. But this similarity is limited: the essence of Etalon 
product design is the mathematical optimizing procedure, the firm’s core competence, 
which is still unique.
Plans for the future
This year three turning points are coming in the firm’s history. One turning 
point is that after a decade of compromises in loudspeaker system design they already 
have the necessary investment capital to build up their own loudspeaker unit 
manufacturing factory, moving the firm from Székesfehérvár to Budapest. This way 
they can design and manufacture exactly the special kind of loudspeaker units with 
the required quality that they really need for their loudspeaker systems, without any 
compromise. They hope this significant technological change will greatly enhance the 
competitive advantage of their loudspeaker systems on the high-end audio market. 
This huge investment was made possible by retaining most of Etalon’s profit from the 
beginning up to now for the development of the company. 
Another turning point is that they launched a brand new product line, called 
Musicante. László Sallay was always unhappy to hear the complaints of Hungarian 
music fans that they couldn’t afford Etalon products. Their prices vary between a few 
thousands and tens of thousands of German marks which is cheap compared to their 
rivals, however, it is still very expensive for somebody with an average Hungarian 
salary. So Sallay designed some cheaper models for the domestic market. He made 
some technical compromises in the design and in the manufacturing process as well: 
musicante models are not hand-made, but produced on a production line. This way 
they can be sold for the equivalent of about a thousand German mark. The first 
domestic measurement and listening test of the debuting Musicante amplifier, called 
Origo, was very positive in Audio, the Hungarian high-end audiofile journal (Nagy, 
2000; Munka, 2000). There is a demand for Musicante products abroad as well, e.g. 
this March  Sallay introduced his new models in Germany.
And the third turning point is that Etalon Acoustics is going to launch its first 
CD player soon. The newcomer equipment comes as a member of the Musicante 
product line. With the new CD player customers can buy a complete stereo set from 
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Etalon Acoustics: CD player, (integrated or separated pre- and power) amplifier, and 
a pair of loudspeakers, all of them representing exactly the same music reproduction 
philosophy.
László Sallay has hopes in a fourth turning point as well: after the European 
success he wants to enter the American market. He is looking for dealers selling 
Etalon products, and he also would like to find investors to establish a joint venture to 
manufacture and distribute Etalon products in the USA for the American market.
Danubilux Ltd.
The beginning
This company was set up in 1997 by Sándor Valkai and Péter Vámosi. Valkai 
was a university lecturer with sound theoretical knwledge who also benefited from a 
British Government academic aid project. This project helped Hungarian academics 
to gain experience in Western style management education. As part of his university 
programme,  Valkai spent a year at a UK university and completed a full time MBA 
programme. A short time after his returning to Hungary, Sándor Valkai left the 
university because of a personal conflict and started to work in the business sector, 
first at a local telephone company, and after that at a satellite telecommunication 
company in marketing managerial jobs. He was very unsatisfied in both cases 
because he realised that he could do very little with his newly acquired knowledge in 
management if the CEO of the company did not have a similar level knowledge in 
this field. As a result he started to look for entrepreneurial opportunities.
This opportunity came when he went to his high school reunion and met 
Vámosi again. Vámosi had been working for one of the major retailors in lighting and 
electronics and he was equally unhappy with his position. He found his company 
slow and reactive that did not have a true entrepreneurial spirit that was necessary to 
success in the rapidly changing market of Hungary’s transitional economy in the mid 
1990s. After a long conversation Valkai and Vámosi decided to team up and set up 
their own enterprise. Vámosi was well connected in lighting retailing and knew the 
market well while Valkai had some previous business experience and the knowledge  
he acquired from his MBA. 
The two enterpreneurs had very little money (they started the business with 
HUF 500 000 which is about £1250) when they started the business in a rented house 
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with a second hand mini van. They worked as a team and did everything on their 
own. They negotiated with suppliers, and shop owners  and they were also the van 
drivers delivering the products to the shops. They did all the marketing, PR and of 
course dealt with all the complaints and daily challenges of the business. It was a 
very demanding  phase of the enterprise and the two owners worked 12-14 hours a 
day, needing a lot of stamina. Their motivation lay partly for the money partly for the 
inner drive for success. They wanted to prove that they could become a great business 
in the competitive world of lighting retailing. 
The lighting retailing trade has many manufacturers. These sell their products 
in bulk to two or three  main retailers who also supply smaller retailers. In the first 
year Danubilux partly built on Vámosi’s contacts and also started to look for new 
suppliers in the world market who were not yet in  Hungary. They did an in depth  
industry analysis and also studied customers’ taste and buying patterns. In the first 
year their turnover was HUF120 million (£30,000). In a year they built up a small 
group of regular customers and also started to look for new ways of increasing their 
sales.
The development of the firm up to the present
The two entrepreneurs learnt very quickly that selling lamps was a capital 
intense business. So they started to look for a partner who would invest into the 
business. Valkai and Vámosi attended all major international fairs of the lighting 
industry and tried to collect as much information about the products, the competitors 
and the suppliers as possible. 
The industry leaders in Europe are a Belgian company called Massive and the 
Italian Eglo Lux. These two companies have 50% of the Hungarian market. The 
second layer of the market consists of smaller companies such as Reflect and 
Rábalux. This is the category where Danubilux started to find its niche and market 
share. 
Valkai found out that Massive, the market leader of the industry, manufactures 
many of its products in China. So he decided to attend the biggest fair in China and 
spoke with all the manufacturers there. He collected as much information as possible 
and after careful data analysis he decided to return to China and start individual 
negotiations with the selected factories.
He knew that in this competitive business it is absolutely essential for survival 
to find the cheapest suppliers who could provide them with high quality products. By 
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1998 Hungary had a growing Chinese community. Through a personal contact Valkai 
was introduced to a Chinese businessman who had interests in various businesses 
around the world and who has also invested into Hungarian companies. After a long 
negotiation first in Budapest then in China Valkai and Vámosi agreed to sell 50% of 
their business to the Chinese investor. As they only needed the money and they did 
not want their investor to take an active part in the daily running of the business they 
very carefully drew up a contract. It meant that the investor will have his initial $ 1 
million repaid by the end of the year 2000. Until then he will own 52% of the 
company and Valkai and Vámosi will have 48%.
Once the capital investment is repaid the balance of shares will go back to 
50% for each side. The Chinese investor agreed not to interfere with the daily running 
of the business, however, in order to guarantee that his interest is properly represented 
and there is transparency in the company he appointed a Chinese woman called Guo 
to oversee the business.
The atmosphere was tense initially both as a result of cultural communications 
and the nature of the contract. Guo had been installed to oversee the project, and 
protect the investor's money, so her brief was simply to watch every move. 
Communication was very difficult because the Hungarian employees of the company 
did not speak Chinese, and Guo did not speak Hungarian so the only common 
language was English. However, it was only Valkai who spoke English at Danubilux. 
Because of the language difficulties, little communication could take place, so her 
role was perceived more as that of an inspector. This created a mistrustful 
atmosphere. Valkai felt rather offended by the lack of trust and Guo felt that she 
could not represent the interests of the Chinese investor because she could not make 
sense of Hungarian accounts and business dealings.
Gradually, however the two sides started to realise that without trust and 
mutual support and helpfulness they would not survive.
Valkai spent almost one hundred days in China in 1998 and negotiated with 
various suppliers. In the end he selected nine lamp manufacturers with whom who 
they  work  Guo of course proved to be a real asset for the company in Hungary. She 
places all the orders with the manufacturers and deals with all the Chinese paperwork 
that is involved.
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Apart from the nine Chinese suppliers Danubilux works with a Finnish 
manufacturer called Rival. There is a niche in the Hungarian market for Finnish 
design in lamps and Danubilux wants to satisfy that demand.
The companies turnover was HUF 220 million (£550,000) in 1999 and around 
HUF 370 million (£925,000) in 2000.
In 1999 the company moved to a spacious office and opened an elegant 
showroom that displays all its key products. They had their own catalogue produced 
containing all the designs that they keep in stock.
Relationships and communication have improved considerably. There are 
more young people with good command of English in the company. Guo has learnt 
some basic Hungarian and is doing a distance learning MBA at The Open University 
Business School’s Hungarian subsidiary, Euro-Contact Business School.
Now the company is well established in the Hungarian market with about 5% 
market share in the industry. The name is well known among competitors and 
customers so Valkai and Vámosi managed to prove to themselves and to the world 
that it is possible to turn disadvantage into an opportunity and with creativity and 
hard work it is possible to overcome difficulties to succeed in international 
competition.
Plans for the future
Danubilux would like to pay back its borrowing to the investor by 2002. They 
had to defer payments from 2000 to 2002 because the business needed a large stock 
investment. In order to satisfy customer needs the company keeps a large stock of the 
products. Unfortunately because of the geographical distance they cannot have a just-
in-time system with the factory. To reduce transport costs they can only order by a 
container. It means that a large amont of the company’s asset is kept in stocks all the 
time.
They have a benchmarking strategy and observe very closely the prices and 
the marketing strategies of the competitors. As they found the cheapest suppliers and 
as they are still a lean organisation they can offer their products lower than the main 
retailers. They regularly offer sales and special prices to small retailers increasing 
their sales and expanding their regular customer base.
Based on their success in Hungary the company now looks into opportunities 
for selling their products in neighbouring countries and perhaps will also try to 
penetrate the Western European market. 
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Conclusion
In this paper we made an attempt to examine the export activities of 
Hungarian companies. We initially collected the available data on central support and 
government initiatives that helped Hungarian companies to succeed in the global 
market. We found that though by 2001 there were no legal obstacles for Hungarian 
companies to export, they were not actively encouraged either. The government set 
up a company called ITD Hungary to promote Hungarian business abroad, and also 
Corvinus Plc. to invest into businesses that Hungarian companies intend to set up in 
the neighbouring countries.
It means that most Hungarian companies who succeed abroad manage to turn 
the lack of support into an opportunity. 
The four companies that we interviewed came from different industries, 
however they all shared some common features.
1. Each business was set up by a charismatic leader or leaders who had a vision and 
who believed in their product, in their creativity and who were prepared to work 
hard for their international success.
2. All of the four companies used innovation as a competitive advantage. In the case 
of Graphisoft it was the development of a unique product, in the case of 
Pharmavit it was product development linked to the consumers' need for a 
healthier life style. Etalon persued a dream of bringing concert quality music into 
people's home at an offordable price. Danubilux worked creatively with the 
supply chain by finding the cheapest global suppliers of quality lamps.
Further study would be necessary to investigate why there are only a few Hungarian 
companies who can succeed in the global market, and why there are a growing 
number of people who live at a very low level of income.
Why is it that some of the Hungarians fight for success and others choose 
depression and burn out? Surely it has something to do with the national character, 
the individual's psyche and the socio-economic environment.
Studying individual, corporate and national success is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, we realised that only complex multi-disciplinary research could find 




The authors wish to thank the owners and managers of these four companies, and the 
ministry officials and members of support organisations for the interviews.
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